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Expert Witness Fees: Proposals For
Change in Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
The diverse body of law concerning expert witnesses' is cur-
rently in an unsettled state. Undoubtedly, the utilization of experts
is essential to the truth-seeking process in many modem situations,
2
but the various rules governing such testimony, as well as the inher-
ent complexity of the subject matter, produce subtle dilemmas for
the courts.3 One such problem that has received a dearth of attention
over the years is that of compensation for the expert witness.4
The practice of paying fees to a witness according to his "coun-
tenance or calling" is a well-settled English practice.5 Support of the
1. An expert is a person experienced, trained and skilled in some particular busi-
ness or subject. He is one who, because of the possession of knowledge not within the
ordinary reach, is specially qualified to speak upon the subject to which his attention
is called.
Micciche v. Forest Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 55 Pa. D. & C. 620, 622 (C.P. Lack. 1945). See also In
re Smith, 24 Ct. Cl. 209 (1889); Lance v. Luzerne County Mfrs. Ass'n, 366 Pa. 398, 77 A.2d 386
(1951); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2203(2) (McNaughton rev. 1961).
As used in this comment, "ordinary" or "regular" witnesses are the witnesses that do not
qualify as expert witnesses.
2. Ordover, Expert Testimony. A Proposed Codefor New York, 19 N.Y. L. FORUM 809
(1974) (expert testimony is now utilized in a majority of the cases tried). See also Stanton v.
Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934); Foreman, How to Choose and Use Plaintiff's
Experts, 12 FORUM 155 (1976); Steakley, Expert Medical Testimony in Texas, I ST. MARY'S
L.J. 161 (1969).
3. State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 82 S.D. 139, 143 N.W.2d 88 (1966).
4. The problem presented would not be a particularly difficult one if experts were
drawn entirely from one profession to give only one type of testimony. But the group
is a large one. It is composed not only of physicians, surgeons, toxicologists, and
specialists in handwriting, but extends to the "great army of experts who are daily
before the courts of the country testifying as to matters of civil engineering, insur-
ance, printing, publishing and binding, mining and a dozen other occupations and
callings which at least in some of their features involve matters beyond the scope of
ordinary knowledge of the ordinary man."
Wade, The Office ofthe Expert Witness, I AM. L. SCHOOL REV. 225, 225 (1904), (reprinted in
Bomar, The Compensation ofExpert Witnesses, 2 L. & CONTEMP. PROs. 510, 510 (1935)).
5. At early common law the payment of fees to compel a witness' presence and testi-
mony was not necessary in England, for every member of society was obliged to aid in the
proper administration of justice. United Dev. Corp. v. State Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439
(N.D. 1965). That rule prevailed until the Statute of Elizabeth, 1562, 5 Eliz. I, c. 9, § 12, which
required that a witness be tendered his reasonable charges according to his "countenance or
calling." This enactment thereby entitled an expert witness to fees higher than that of other
witnesses. See, e.g., Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Clark v. Gill, 69 Eng.
Rep. 351 (1854); Webb v. Page, 174 Eng. Rep. 695 (1843). Webb is the first case that expressly
English tradition, however, waned in early American case law, yield-
ing a rather balanced split of authority.6 Historically, Pennsylvania
courts have held that an expert in civil proceedings is entitled to ex-
pert fees, for his knowledge is a property right that may not be ex-
acted without just compensation.7 An expert in Pennsylvania
criminal proceedings, however, is not similarly favored, and he may
be compelled by either party to testify in an expert capacity for no
greater amount than the statutorily prescribed fee of an ordinary wit-
ness.' This dubious distinction is based upon the sovereign power of
the Commonwealth and the lack of such power by the private liti-
gant.
The propriety of granting an expert witness compensation
higher than that received by an ordinary witness has not yet reached
a definitive resolution in this country. This comment argues that ex-
pert witnesses should receive professional fees commensurate with
the professional services they render in both civil and criminal trials.
If greater fees are not granted, great inequities will continue. By con-
trasting the current state of the law in Pennsylvania with other ap-
proaches taken on the national level, certain appropriate reforms for
Pennsylvania become apparent, reforms governed by the thesis that
Pennsylvania trial judges should be afforded greater discretion in the
appointment and the cost apportionment of expert witnesses.
II. Present State of the Law
A. Factual Observations
The proposition that a court may compel any person9 to testify
at trial to facts within his personal knowledge is universally recog-
nized. This general rule is based upon the theory that all members
of the community benefit from the proper administration of justice,
and therefore, each citizen owes a duty to the community to testify to
distinguished between a witness testifying to facts and a witness testifying from his expertise.
H. ROGERS, THE LAW OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 194 (1883).
The Statute of Elizabeth, 1562, 5 Eliz. 1, c. 9, § 12 is reprinted in J. WIGMORE, supra note
1, at § 2201(2)(a) n.1.
6. For early American cases following the English practice, see, e.g., United States v.
Howe, 26 F. Cas. 394 (W.D. Ark. 1881); In re Roelker, 20 F. Cas. 1092 (D. Mass. 1854);
Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877). See also Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6
F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (944); Pennsylvania
Co. for Ins. L. & G.A. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918); Gerhard v. Berks
County, 19 Pa. Dist. 209 (C.P. Berks 1909).
For early American cases rejecting the English practice, see, e.g., Exparte Demente, 53
Ala. 389 (1875); Dixon v. People, 168 111. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Summers v. State, 5 Tex.
App. 374 (1879). See also Commissioners of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt, 395 Il. 316, 69 N.E.2d
869 (1946), which followed Dixon.
7. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra.
8. The Witnesses Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 416.1 to .10 (Purdon 1958 & Cum.
Supp. 1978-79).
9. Contrary to this rule, however, testimony of a criminal defendant may not be com-
pelled. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
relevant facts within his knowledge. Such compulsion may be anal-
ogized to a tax or a charge imposed by the government for its sup-
port or for special facilities or services. Thus, even though most
states have enacted statutes entitling an ordinary witness to a meager
fee for his testimony,'o their enactment is not the sine qua non of the
courts' power to compel attendance."
Expert witnesses are not differentiated from ordinary witnesses
in testifying to facts that are within their common personal knowl-
edge. Courts may compel an expert witness to testify to the same
facts as a non-expert witness for the same insignificant fee.' 2 To il-
lustrate, if a surgeon and a painter saw a car fail to stop at a red
light, each could be equally compelled to so testify at trial for the
same compensation. The rationale is simple: the expert in this situa-
tion is not testifying in his expert capacity; rather, he is testifying as a
lay witness.
Jurisdictions that do not favor higher compensation for an ex-
pert witness, however, usually confuse the issue by extending this
concept to include a situation in which the expert, but for his exper-
tise, would not know or understand something to be a fact. '3 For
example, if the surgeon and painter came upon a pedestrian who had
been struck by a car, the surgeon would probably be able to diagnose
the pedestrian's injuries to a greater degree of certainty than the
painter. Those jurisdictions that prohibit special expert witness com-
pensation would compel the surgeon to testify to the "facts" of the
situation as he knows them. The surgeon, therefore, although testi-
fying for a lay witness' fee, would be required to relate the injuries of
the pedestrian to the fact finder. Compelling such a presentation of
the "facts," however, may be tantamount to extracting an expert
opinion from the expert,' 4 which cannot be justified by the "tax by
the government" analogy mentioned earlier. 1'
10. All witnesses in Pennsylvania, for example, are paid $5.00 per diem, plus mileage and
lodging. The Witnesses Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 416.2, .4, .6 (Purdon 1958 & Cum.
Supp. 1978-79).
1I. Hall, Extra Compensationfor Expert Witnesses, 2 J. FOR. Scl. 81, 83 (1957). See also
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Penn-
sylvania Co. for Ins. L. & G.A. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918); In re Grand
Jury, April Term, 1977 Wayne County, 251 Pa. Super. Ct. 43, 379 A.2d 323 (1977); Cohen v.
Continental Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 (1926); J. RICHARDSON, DOCTORS, LAWYERS, AND
THE COURTS 84-86 (1965); Note, Cost of the Expert in CivilLitigation, 2 SYRACUSE L. REV. 324
(1951) [hereinafter cited as Cost ofthe Experts]; 51 W. VA. L.Q. 74, 75 (1948).
12. Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877); H. ROGERS, supra note 5, at § 90; Hutchins, The
Compensation ofMedical Witnesses, 4 MICH. L. REV. 413 (1906).
13. San Francisco v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
See also Hall, supra note I1, at 81.
14. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text infra.
15. Under this circumstance the compelled expert testimony would represent unduly
heavy "taxation." See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
B. Expert Opinion
The most difficult situation that can arise in determining the ap-
propriate amount of an expert witness' fee occurs when the witness
offers testimony, without preparation, in an expert capacity. 6 This
occurrence is vividly exemplified when an expert who is entirely un-
familiar with the case is called upon to respond to hypothetical ques-
tions. Absent a contract, 17 many courts deny an extraordinary fee to
witnesses who testify in an expert capacity' 8 and often compel ex-
perts to disclose previously formed opinions without allowing expert
compensation. 19 Other courts, however, have declared that an expert
may not be compelled to testify in an expert capacity without the
payment of just compensation.2 °
C. Pretrial Conclusions
It is generally accepted that the pretrial conclusions of an expert
16. H. ROGERS, supra note 5, at § 190. "In this country the cases are so nearly balanced,
that the question must be regarded as still an open one." 1d; Porterfield, The Right to Sub-
poena Expert Testimony and the Fees Required to be Paid Therefor, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 50, 53-54
(1953); Hutchins, supra note 12, at 413; 31 AM. JUR. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 10
(1967).
The distinction between fact and opinion is often difficult to draw, as was evident by the
illustration set forth in section II.A. supra, for some jurisdictions include as "facts" that which
would not be known but for the expertise of the expert.
17. See notes 135-36 and accompanying text infra.
18. E.g., Alexander v. Watson, 128 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1942); Mattson v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 43 F.R.D. 523 (N.D. Ohio 1967); United States v. 284,392 Square Feet of Floor Space,
203 F. Supp. 75 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Exparte Demente, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); Dixon v. People, 168
111. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Main v. Sherman Co., 74 Neb. 155, 103 N.W. 1038 (1905) (per
curiam); United Dev. Corp. v. State Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1965); In re Ap-
propriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 115 Ohio App. 426, 185 N.E.2d 485 (1961);
Summers v. State, 5 Tex. App. 374 (1879); Ealy v. Shetler Ice Cream Co., 108 W. Va. 184, 150
S.E. 539 (1929); Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909); see J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 1, § 2203(2)(c); Rogers, Extra Compensationfor the Expert Witness, 35 L.
NOTES 227 (March 1932).
19. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
929 (1973); United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 406 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (mem.) (expert witness' motion to quash subpoena denied), affidsub. nom, Kaufman v.
Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976); Swope v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937);
Ramacorti v. Boston Redev. Auth., 341 Mass. 377, 170 N.E.2d 323 (1960); Nielson v. Brown,
232 Ore. 426, 374 P.2d 896 (1962); State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 82 S.D. 139, 143 N.W.2d 88
(1966); A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES, & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES
§ 1.07 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MOENSSENS].
Even though the right of an expert witness to additional compensation is unenforceable in
these jurisdictions, most attorneys realize the potential hardship to and hostility from an expert
who is not adequately compensated, and therefore, offer a fair and reasonable fee. Neverthe-
less, an attorney could subpoena an expert and pay him the statutory fee. Stanton v.
Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934); H. LIEBENSON, YOU, THE EXPERT WITNESS, 79-
81 (1962); H. LIEBENSON & J. WEPMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGIST AS A WITNESS, 143 (1964); H.
ROGERS, supra note 5, at § 188; Comment, Expert Witness Fees, 43 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 777
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Expert Witness Fees].
20. See, e.g., Tiedtke v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 222 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1969); Buchman v.
State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 37 A.2d 53 (1944); Braverman v.
Braverman, 21 N.J. Super. 367, 91 A.2d 226 (Ch. Div. 1952); Birch v. Sees, 178 App. Div. 609,
165 N.Y.S. 846 (1917); Gerhard v. Berks County, 19 Pa. Dist. 209 (C.P. Berks 1909); J. RICH-
ARDSON, supra note 11, at § 2.9.
employed by a party are the property right of the expert and his
employer.2' Although pretrial conclusions are discoverable by the
state in a criminal proceeding for the protection of the public, such
conclusions need not be disclosed in civil litigation to a private party
who does not pay for them.22 Otherwise a private party could ex-
amine the other party's expert by deposition and obtain the property
of the employing party without making reasonable compensation.
23
D. Special Services
Even if he is not entitled to an extra fee, an expert witness is
always entitled to extra compensation from a party for special serv-
ices or preparation for trial if these services are requested by that
party. This principle extends to additional services that are per-
formed to qualify the expert witness for trial,24 including observing
the testimony of prior ordinary and expert witnesses.25 Whether
merely answering hypothetical questions alone can be considered a
special service in those jurisdictions that deny greater fees for expert
witnesses, however, is not certain.26 Yet, in practice it seems unlikely
that an attorney would subpoena an expert to testify in support of his
cause without some private arrangement for compensation since the
attorney certainly could not rely on an expert who is being paid a
21. Hickey v. United States, 18 F.R.D. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (condemnation proceeding in
which the plaintiff was not permitted to obtain a list of the government's appraisers to use to
solicit an expert opinion); Steindler, Lawyer and Expert: A Cooperative Exercise, 12 TRIAL 46
(July 1976).
22. Walsh v. Reynolds Metal Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 378 (D.N.J. 1954).
23. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Doyle, 40 F.R.D. 478 (N.D. I11. 1966) (memorandum opinion)
(defendant required to split expert's fees to depose plaintiffs expert); Walsh v. Reynolds Metal
Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594
(W.D. Pa. 1947) (dicta).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (B) and (C), which state that if a party discovers "facts
known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called
as a witness at trial," or if the court orders extraordinary discovery, then, unless "manifest
injustice" would result, the party seeking discovery must "pay the expert a reasonable fee for
time spent in responding to discovery. . . [and] the other party a fair portion of the fees and
expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the ex-
pert." See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
24. See, e.g., Alexander v. Watson, 128 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1942); Flinn v. Prairie County,
60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895); Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463 (1857); Klepper v. Klepper, 199
Mo. App. 294, 202 S.W. 593 (1918); Birch v. Sees, 178 App. Div. 609, 165 N.Y.S. 846 (1917)
(per curiam); Gerhard v. Berks County, 19 Pa. Dist. 209 (C.P. Berks 1909); Ealy v. Shetler Ice
Cream Co., 108 W. Va. 184, 150 S.E. 539 (1929). See also J. WiGMORE, supra note 1, § 2203(2)
(c)(A); Bomar, supra note 4, at 517; 39 YALE L.J. 761 (1930).
25. Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895).
[The expert] cannot be required to make any examination or preliminary preparation
nor can he be compelled to attend the trial and listen to the testimony that he may be
better enabled to give his opinion as an expert. For any service of this kind he may
demand extra compensation.
Id at 206, 29 S.W. at 460. See also People v. Barnes, 111 Cal. App. 605, 295 P. 1045 (1931);
Barnes v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941); Summers v. State, 5
Tex. App. 374 (1879); Hutchins, supra note 12, at 423.
26. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
nominal fee. Moreover, the expert could easily avoid the problem by
coupling his testimony with some special service to make him eligi-
ble for extra compensation.27 In the unlikely event that the expert is
required to answer hypothetical questions without promise of extra
compensation, however, withholding payment for his testimony,
which is a product of his training and experience, would be clearly
"unjust and without legal justification."28
III. Considerations Supporting and Opposing Expert Witness
Fees
A. Arguments Favoring Expert Compensation
Courts and commentators have advanced several arguments for
and against the practice of paying greater fees for expert opinion
testimony, but on balance, the arguments in favor of higher fees are
overwhelmingly superior.
1. The Opinion as a Property Right.- The most obvious argu-
ment for allowing higher fees is that the skill, knowledge, and experi-
ence of an expert are his individual capital and property, which no
party may utilize without payment of reasonable compensation. No
party, public or private, has the right to extort professional services
from an expert, absent a fair and just fee. The pendantry of an ex-
pert cannot be confiscated by the public any more than can the
goods of the merchant.29 Moreover, the property interest that an ex-
pert has in his professional knowledge does not have to be of a tangi-
ble, corporeal character to merit protection from seizure or
encroachment.3 °
An expert's opinion ought not receive one value when volunta-
rily divulged in his office, and another when it is compulsorily ex-
tracted in a courtroom. He is privileged to give or withhold it at his
pleasure. Any party who calls upon an expert for an opinion should
be obliged to remunerate the professional for the service rendered.
The expert, in turn, should be permitted to decline to give his opin-
ion until paid, and should not be penalized for so refusing.
31
27. Bomar, supra note 4, at 520, 522.
28. Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934).
29. Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877). See also In re Smith, 24 Ct. CI. 209 (1889);
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. L. & G.A. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918); Cohen v.
Continental Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 (1926); Hutchins, supra note 12, at 414.
30. The common-law copyright represents an analogous interest that was a fully pro-
tected intangible property right. Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. I (1877); see also Flynt v. Leis, 434
F. Supp. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (an attorney has a proprietary interest in representing his cli-
ent); Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (physician's hospital
staff privileges are property rights).
31. H. RoGERs, supra note 5, at § 191. See also United States v. Howe, 26 F. Cas. 394
(W.D. Ark. 1881); Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877); Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L. 511, 514,37
A.2d 53, 56 (1944); Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934); Gerhard v. Berks
Furthermore, any significant taking of property by a govern-
mental entity must satisfy constitutional mandates. The appropria-
tion of an expert's opinion without reasonable compensation is a
deprivation of proprietary interest in violation of the due process
clauses of the fifth and the fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution.32
2. Significance of Expert Testimony.- The expert serves a vital
function at trial, and his responsibility is considerable. In many in-
stances he carries more responsibility at trial than an ordinary wit-
ness. The purpose of his testimony is to assist the trier of the facts to
understand, evaluate, and base decisions upon the complex eviden-
tiary matters of a case.33 He applies his knowledge, experience and
skills to facts to draw inferences that the fact finder, be it a judge or
jury, could not intelligently draw on its own. Indeed, by using the
tools of his profession to render opinions that are admissible evi-
dence,' the expert often determines the outcome of cases.
3. Unwarranted Beneft to the Calling Party.- If an expert is
required to give his professional opinion without extra compensa-
tion, the interested party who called the expert will receive an unjust
benefit. The inequity is especially evident when the expert's testi-
mony has an obvious effect on the fact finder; for instance, when the
fact finder's decision could be reached only by reliance on the ex-
pert's testimony. Thus, the expert's fee should reflect the immediate
contribution that the expert's testimony makes to the calling party's
County, 19 Pa. Dist. 209, 211-12 (C.P. Berks 1909); Bomar, supra note 4, at 510; Cost of the
Expert, supra note I1, at 324; Rogers, supra note 18, at 228.
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Eisenberg v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 1274
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa.
1971); U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. See also, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
In addition, a Pennsylvania court has held that the Constitution states that no citizen's
property may be taken or used by the government without reasonable compensation. Gerhard
v. Berks County, 19 Pa. Dist. 209 (C.P. Berks 1909). "It is not easy to see why the spirit, if not
the letter, of this provision does not protect a person from being made an expert witness except
upon terms of reasonable compensation, for which the ordinary fee bill furnishes no stan-
dard." Id at 211. See also Bomar, supra note 4, at 510-11, 513-14.
33. United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 313 (D.N.J. 1976) (mem.).
See Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877).
The position of a medical witness, testifying as an expert, is much more like that of a
lawyer than that of an ordinary witness, testifying to facts. The purpose of his service
is not to prove facts in the cause, but to aid the court or jury in arriving at a proper
conclusion from facts otherwise proved.
Id at 13. See also H. ROGERS, supra note 5, at § 190.
34. Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. 1(1877); Lance v. Luzerne County Mfr. Ass'n, 366 Pa. 398,
77 A.2d 386 (1951); Micciche v. Forest Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 55 Pa. D. & C. 620 (C.P. Lack.
1945); J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 2 (2d ed.
1976); Bomar, supra note 4, at 510-11, 513-14; Hall, supra note 11 at 86-87; Expert Witness
Fees, supra note 19; Comment, Expert Witness Fees: Protectionfor the Indigent Party, 48 Nw.
U. L. REV. 106 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Protectionfor the Indigent Party].
case regardless of the outcome of the case,35 since the party can now
present the fact finder with another piece of valuable evidence to
weigh in the truth-determining process. And if the party receiving
the benefit is actually successful, a quantum meruit measure of com-
pensation would be appropriate, even though such a measure by it-
self could influence an expert to color his testimony inordinately in
the calling party's favor.36
4. Unwarranted Detriment to the Witness.- Besides unjustly
benefiting the calling party, exacting valuable time from an expert
with the tender of ordinary fees burdens him with unjustifiable
financial hardship. The denial of extra compensation to an expert
witness places a serious burden on honest experts, especially on those
experts whose income depends solely upon the rendering of profes-
sional services. 37 Time is valuable to an expert, particularly the
hours of the day that court is in session, for those are normally his
business hours. Thus, when an expert is compelled to spend time in
a courtroom, even though he testifies for only a slight portion of that
time, he should receive the compensation that he otherwise would
have earned.38
Furthermore, if experts were unable to obtain fees equivalent to
the fair market value of their services, competent experts could find
themselves required to attend an unreasonable number of trials.39
Although this practice would decrease the necessary litigation ex-
penses of many clients since eminent experts would render opinions
for the ordinary witness fee whenever they are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of a court that can compel their attendance, such circumstances
are so unreasonably burdensome to the witness that nothing short of
absolute necessity could justify the practice.4 °
35. Cohen v. Continental Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 (1926). See also J. BEEMAN,
THE PATHOLOGIST AS A WITNESS, 9 (1964) (noting that neither the attorney conducting a
lawsuit nor the pathologist witness is obliged to serve gratuitously); Bomar, supra note 4, at
511-14; Rogers, supra note 18, at 228.
36. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text infra.
37. Bomar, supra note 4, at 522. See also H. LIEBENSON, YOU, THE EXPERT WITNESS 79-
81, 1962; Doud, Answering the Cross-Examiner on Expert Witness Fees, 2 J. FOR. Sci. 88
(1957); 8 Mo. L. REV. 68 (1943).
38. H. LIEBENSON & J. WEPMAN, supra note 19, at 143; Bomar, supra note 4, at 5 10-1l.
39. If an individual is accomplished in the subject area of a particular case, and the party
in need of the expert testimony would only have to pay the expert a regular witness fee, then
the expert would naturally be called by the party.
40. In re Roelker, 20 F. Cas. 1092 (D. Mass. 1854) (judge refused to issue capias for a
subpoenaed German interpreter, citing a lack of necessity for that particular interpreter). See
also Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Carter-Wallace,
Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973); United States v.
International Business Machs. Corp., 406 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) aff'd sub nom, Kauf-
man v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1976); Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. I (1877); Bomar,
supra note 4 at 514; Cost of the Expert, supra note 11; Rogers, supra note 26, at § 191; 8 Mo.
L. REv. 68 (1943).
B. Arguments Opposed to Expert Compensation
The arguments against extra compensation to expert witnesses
are less substantive than the arguments for higher compensation. In-
deed, none effectively refutes the arguments of the opposing posi-
tion.
I. An Expert's Knowledge is Not a Property Right.- According
to this view, no property right exists in the expert's knowledge qua
knowledge. Rather, property lies in the right to apply that knowl-
edge to the accomplishment of a particular result. Thus, rendering
an expert opinion from the witness stand in response to a hypotheti-
cal question is not compensable under a theory of property since the
mere rendition of the opinion is not applied knowledge. To qualify
his knowledge as a property right, the expert must use his skills and
experience to achieve a specific end, as, for example, a physician's
examination, diagnosis, and treatment of a particular patient's symp-
toms and injuries.4
This requirement of a concrete result, however, seems flawed,
for when an expert is asked to respond to hypothetical questions, the
expert, and everyone else in the courtroom, is fully cognizant that
the questions are composed of all the material facts of the specific
case at hand. By answering the questions the expert is applying his
knowledge, skill, and experience to accomplish a particular result,
which is to present evidence for the ultimate success of the question-
ing party.42 That the result is not in the form normally produced by
the expert's labors is irrelevant since the same knowledge and experi-
ence are drawn upon to achieve it.
2. An Expert Witness is Not Unduly Burdened *hen Compelled
to Testfy.- One could argue that loss of time caused by testifying at
trial is no more a hardship on the expert witness than it is on any
other witness.4 3 When non-expert witnesses are subpoenaed, they
must attend the trial and make their testimony available, usually for
41. Exparte Demente, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108
(1897); Swope v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937). This argument has not been ad-
vanced by the courts for the past forty years. See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at
§ 2203(2)(c).
The argument that knowledge, when not applied to obtain a concrete result, is not a prop-
erty right has been logically extended to the proposition that the extraction of an expert's
knowledge without remuneration of a reasonable amount does not violate the constitutional
safeguards of the due process clauses. Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Swope
v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937); Bomar, supra note 4, at 515. See also note 32 and
accompanying text supra.
42. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
43. Swope v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937); Main v. Sherman County, 74 Neb.
155, 103 N.W. 1038 (1905) (per curiam); J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2203(2)(c); Bomar, supra
note 4, at 515; Rogers, supra note 18, at 227; 15 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 343 (1937).
a statutorily prescribed per diem fee." These nonprofessionals lose
income they would otherwise derive from their trade just as the ex-
pert is unable to earn a livelihood from his practice while present in
court. Hence, expert witnesses should not receive greater compensa-
tion than that paid to non-expert witnesses.
Nevertheless, if one assumes that the expert witness' average
daily income is higher than that of the ordinary witness, the relative
hardship imposed upon the expert by being paid the same fixed fee
the ordinary witness receives appears greater.45 Indeed, even though
every citizen is obliged to make personal sacrifices to aid the proper
administration of justice,46 if the taxing analogy47 is used to explain
this sacrifice, the expert is being taxed at a higher rate than other
witnesses since his time is more valuable.48
3. The Legislatures Determine Witness Fees.- It is often ar-
gued that if a legislature had intended a large group of potential wit-
nesses to receive extra compensation, then special provisions would
have been enacted.49 This argument, though obviously true, is not
persuasive and does not respond to present-day realities; many legis-
latures have considered the inequity of providing one fee for all wit-
nesses and have enacted special provisions allowing greater
compensation for expert witnesses.50
4. Higher Fees Increase Litigation Costs.- Some commenta-
tors have pointed out that paying higher expert fees will greatly in-
crease the cost of litigation.5" Like the argument of legislative intent,
44. For example, the current witness fee in Pennsylvania is $5.00 per day. The Witnesses
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 416.2 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
45. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
An additional consideration in favor of extra compensation is the hardship that will be
suffered by those people who depend upon the professional services of the expert. The time an
expert spends in a courtroom detracts from the time he would normally spend in practice.
46. Exparte Demente, 53 Ala. 389 (1875); County Comm'rs v. Lee, 3 Colo. App. 177, 32
P. 841 (1893); Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Main v. Sherman County, 74
Neb. 155, 103 N.W. 1038 (1905) (per curiam); Summers v. State, 5 Tex. App. 374 (1879);
Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1909); J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, at
§ 2203(2)(c); Rogers, supra note 18, at 227. But see State v. Bell, 212 Mo. App. I 1, 111 S.W.
24 (1908); Burnett v. Freedman, 125 Mo. App. 683, 103 S.W. 121 (1907) (expressly rejecting the
"duty as a citizen" argument for expert witnesses).
47. See notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
48. Of course, one could argue that the expert draws a greater benefit from society, and
therefore, it is not unreasonable to require him to contribute more.
49. See, e.g., Flinn v. Prairie County, 60 Ark. 204, 29 S.W. 459 (1895).
50. See statutes cited in notes 82-88 and accompanying text infra.
51. Bomar, supra note 4, at 515-16. See also J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2202(2)(b);
Foreman, supra note 2 (trend in aviation accident litigation is toward excessive use of expert
witnesses, thereby inducing exhorbitant costs).
An extension of the "cost of litigation" argument is the concept that an eye witness is
more deserving of extra compensation than an expert witness.
[Sbo far as concerns the policy of doing whatever should attract and not deter desira-
ble witnesses, it would seem that no special favor need be shown to expert witnesses.
No one will ever refrain from entering a professional calling because of the fear of
this proposition is true, but its cogency must be questioned. Ideally,
government is bound to supply access to justice, and expense should




In a Pennsylvania criminal proceeding the court can compel an
expert witness to testify for the Commonwealth or the defendant
merely by delivering a subpoena and tendering an ordinary witness
fee to him.53 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained this
power thus: "The State or the United States may call upon her citi-
zens to testify as experts in matters affecting the common weal, but
that is because of the duty which the citizen owes to his government,
and is an exercise of its sovereign power."54 Nevertheless, the state
may not impose a duty upon an expert to perform special services,
such as examinations or pretrial preparation,5' and- when he or any
other witness attends and testifies with or without a subpoena,56 or
attends pursuant to a subpoena but is not called upon to testify, 7 he
is entitled to a statutory fee of five dollars.5" Although this voluntary
witness, neither subpoenaed nor called, is not entitled to the witness
fee,59 some courts have held that such an individual may be entitled
to the fee if he attends in good faith, fully expecting his testimony to
having to spend his time gratuitously at trials; and yet an ordinary person is often
deterred from observing (or disclosing his observation) of a street accident or the like
because of the apprehension of being summoned as a witness; so that the latter sort, if
either, should be the one to be encouraged by special compensation.
Swope v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 931, 67 P.2d 416, 418 (1937) (quoting J. WIGMORE, supra note I,
§ 2203(2)(c)).
52. J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2202(2)(b).
53. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. L. & G.A. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918);
Commonwealth v. Cochran, 31 Pa. County Ct. 344, 14 Dist. 805, 9 Del. 547, 23 Lanc. 142, 19
York 107 (C.P. 1905).
Absent a statute, the following standards should be considered when deciding whether to
compel the attendance of an expert witness: the nature of the action, the nature of the testi-
mony, and the status, relationship, and situation of the expert and the other party. Karp v.
Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Tex. 1972). See also Porterfield, supra note 16.
54. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. L. & G.A. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 441, 105 A. 630, 630
(1918). See also Diller v. Crawford County, 42 Pa. County Ct. 17, 23 Dist. 551 (C.P. Craw.
1913); H. LIEBENSON, supra note 19, at 78-79.
55. Diller v. Drawford County, 42 Pa. County Ct. 17, 23 Dist. 551 (C.P. Craw. 1913) (a
doctor cannot be compelled to perform a post-mortem exam). See also notes 16-20 and ac-
companying text supra.
56. The Witnesses Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 416.7 (Purdon 1958).
57. Walker v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 29 A.2d 358 (1942); Capozzola &
Kent v. D'Isidoro, 29 Northam. 211 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
58. See note 44 supra.
59. Cf. Walker v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 Pa. Super. Ct. 26, 29 A.2d 358 (1942) (defense
witnesses who were informed of a nonsuit on their way to the courthouse were held not to have
"attended" the trial within the purview of the Witnesses Act and, therefore, were not entitled
to statutory witness fee).
be taken.6°
In addition to the ordinary witness fee authorized by the legisla-
ture for the expert, the district attorney has been held to possess the
implied authority to bind a county by agreeing with an expert to the
payment of a "reasonable fee" for his services as an expert witness.6'
Indeed, failure to imply such authority can easily paralyze the prose-
cutor's office and frustrate its duties62 since an expert witness often
plays an integral role in the Commonwealth's case in prosecutions
for violent crimes.
Thus, under current law in Pennsylvania an expert can be com-
pelled to testify at trial for a fee of five dollars per day, as long as he
is not requested to perform any professional services other than an-
swering hypothetical questions. Compelling an expert to testify for
such a meager fee seems inadvisable, however, since the witness may
enter the judicial arena hostile toward the interested party.63 Many
nonindigent defendants frequently employ experts to avoid just this
problem.'M The criminal defendant who lacks the financial resources
to acquire an expert's services, on the other hand, must seek a court-
appointed expert or request the county to either pay his expenses or
provide the necessary experts. But since the granting of such a re-
quest is discretionary with a judge who must operate within budget-
ary constraints, the defendant may be effectively denied his right to a
fair trial if his request is denied and he must rely on a potentially
60. Commonwealth v. Mateer, 46 Pa. D. & C. 79 (C.P. Cumb. 1942); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 4 Pa. County Ct. 321 (C.P. Northumb. 1887).
61. Gerhard v. Berks County, 19 Pa. Dist. 209 (C.P. Berks 1909). But see Diller v. Craw-
ford County, 42 Pa. County Ct. 17, 23 Dist. 551 (C.P. Craw. 1913). Diller expressly refused to
adopt Gerhard, declaring that the district attorney lacked any implied authority to employ a
witness for expert testimony. Diller concludes, however, on a practical note.
We are willing to concede that it is not fair to the expert, who, because of his recog-
nized learning, is hailed from one end of the state to the other, to require him to
render these unusual services for the ordinary per diem witness fee, but the remedy is
in the legislature and not in the courts.
Id at 18, 23 Pa. Dist. at 552. See also Niles & Neff v. York County, 15 Pa. Dist. 717 (C.P.
York 1906); Wyoming County Auditors, 30 Pa. County Ct. 631 (C.P. Wyo. 1905).
62. Gerhard v. Berks County, 19 Pa. Dist. 209 (C.P. Berks 1909). The implied power to
employ experts to perform effectively the functions of a public office has been found to exist in
other public positions. See, e.g., Niles & Neff v. York County, 15 Pa. Dist. 717 (C.P. York
1906); Wyoming County Auditors, 30 Pa. County Ct. 631 (C.P. Wyo. 1905). In both cases
county auditors, before the institution of a regulatory statute, were assumed to possess the
implied power to employ counsel for advice at the expense of the county.
See also, e.g., Gaston v. Board of Comm'rs, 3 Ind. 497 (1852); County of Allegheny v.
Shaw, 34 Pa. 301 (1859); County ofNortham. v. Innes, 26 Pa. 156 (1856); Allegheny County v.
Watt, 3 Pa. 462 (1846). In each of these cases the coroner was deemed to have the implied
power to employ a physician to conduct an autopsy at the expense of the county. See also
Hutchins, supra note 12, at 423-26.
63. J. BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 9-10, 11; 13 BROOKLYN L. REV. 216 (1947); 51 W. VA.
L.Q. 74 (1948).
64. Commonwealth v. Cochran, 31 Pa. County Ct. 344, 14 Dist. 805, 9 Del. 547, 23 Lanc.
142, 19 York 107 (C.P. 1905); see note 25 supra.
hostile witness.65
Clearly, the restrictive provisions concerning expert witness fees
in Pennsylvania criminal trials are inadequate. A procedure by
which expert services would be made available to indigent defend-
ants must be adopted by Pennsylvania, with professional services
available upon a showing of manifest necessity.66 Although the court
would render the final determination, if minimal indicia defining
"necessity" were adopted, a less discretionary and more desirable
procedure would be available. Ideally, court appointed experts,
financed by a separately budgeted appropriation, should be made
available and easily accessible to the needy indigent criminal de-
fendant.67
B. Civil
Pennsylvania civil proceedings have consistently recognized the
property right of an expert in his knowledge. "[Tihe private litigant
has no more right to compel a citizen to give up the product of his
brain than he has to compel the giving up of material things. 68
Thus, in Pennsylvania an axiom diametrically opposed to the crimi-
nal rule is applied when a witness is called to testify as an expert in a
civil litigation.69 Procurement of an expert's service, no matter how
minute, is a "matter of bargain" between the expert and the inter-
ested party, 70 and the courts will not compel an expert to attend liti-
gation procedures and render an opinion in favor of a private
litigant.7
65. Diller v. Crawford County, 42 Pa. County Ct. 17, 23 Dist. 551 (C.P. Craw. 1913);
Expert Witness Fees, supra note 19, at 777.
Experts called on behalf of indigent defendants may not have adequate means and oppor-
tunity to aid the defendant when the primary function of the witness is to answer spontane-
ously complex hypothetical questions. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
The criminal-civil distinction in Pennsylvania law also constitutes an inconsistent applica-
tion of due process. Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); Swope v. State, 145 Kan.
928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937).
66. See, e.g., notes 110, 114 and accompanying text infra.
67. Id.
68. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. L. & G.A. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 442, 105 A. 630, 630
(1918). See also In re Smith, 24 Ct. CI. 209 (1889); Rau v. Wilder Acres, Inc., 34 Northam. 88
(Pa. C.P. 1955) (expert witness is entitled to more than the statutory fee); Packard v. Pittsburgh
Ry., 87 Pitts. L.J. 219, 222 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1939) (such professional services should be compen-
sated upon the basis of charges that are fair and reasonable in the light of the nature, character
and extent of the services rendered).
69. There is no presumption that an expert, when subpoenaed, is summoned as an expert
witness. Cohen v. Continental Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 (1926).
70. E.g., Evans v. Otis Elevator Co., 403 Pa. 13, 168 A.2d 573 (1961); Cohen v. Continen-
tal Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 (1926); McCandless v. Maguire, 60 Dauph. 502 (Pa. C.P.
1950) (a physician will not be compelled to appear and express an opinion at a deposition).
71. E.g., Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 83 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.
Pa. 1938), af§'d, 107 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1939); Lance v. Luzerne County Mfrs. Ass'n, 366 Pa. 398,
77 A.2d 386 (1951); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. L. & G.A., 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918); Cohen
v. Continental Cas. Co., 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 367 (1926); McCandless v. Maguire, 60 Dauph. 502
(Pa. C.P. 1950); Commonwealth ex rel. Shawley v. Lucas, 24 Pa. County Ct. 126 (C.P. Centre
1900); Bomar, supra note 4, at 220.
The Pennsylvania Witnesses Act of July 21, 1941,72 which per-
mits, inter alia, an amount equal to the ordinary witness fee 73 to'be
taxed as costs in litigation,74 mandates a procedure that necessarily
breeds serious difficulties. The Act was intended to serve as a gen-
eral law on the subject, superseding earlier acts.75 It expressly ac-
knowledges the right of an expert witness to receive additional
See also State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 82 S.D. 139, 142, 143 N.W.2d 88, 90 (1966)
(recognizing that Pennsylvania views expert testimony as a property right that must be bar-
gained for).
If a witness gives expert testimony that he did not contract to give, he is barred from
subsequently claiming additional compensation. Anderson v. State Dep't of Roads, 184 Neb.
467, 168 N.W.2d 522 (1969).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 416.1 to .10 (Purdon 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
73. Id at § 416.2 (Cum. Supp.).
74. In re Hahn's Estate, 44 Pa. D. & C. 535, 548, 19 Leh. 327, 341 (C.P. 1941); PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 416.1 to .10 (Purdon 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
75. Walker v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 82, 29 A.2d 358, 359 (1942); Rau
v. Wilden Acres, Inc., 34 Northam. 88, 90 (Pa. C.P. 1955). The following are the earlier wit-
ness acts of Pennsylvania: 1933 Pa. Laws 851; 1927 Pa. Laws 463; 1907 Pa. Laws 364, § I, as
amended by 1919 Pa. Laws 258, § I and 1923 Pa. Laws 1046, § 1; 1889 Pa. Laws 8, § 1.
Pennsylvania courts have specified, however, that the Business Corporation Act of 1933
(1933 Pa. Laws 364, § 908(b), as amended by 1941 Pa. Laws 13, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 2852-2908 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1908 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-
79))), is not pre-empted by the Witnesses Act of 1941, for the later statute does not provide for
a complete and comprehensive method of performing the tasks of the earlier statute. More-
over, the methods employed by each statute can be harmonized. Ashton v. Pittsburgh Consoli-
dated Coal Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 277, 97 Pitts. L.J. 249 (C.P. Alleg. 1949). Thus, dissenting
shareholders may tax the "fair value" of an appraiser's services as litigation costs. Duddy v.
Conshohocken Printing Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 402, 70 Montg. 388 (C.P. 1954); Ashton v. Pitts-
burgh Consolidated Coal Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 277, 97 Pitts. L.J. 249 (C.P. Alleg. 1949).
Other sections of the 1941 Witnesses Act limit the term "witness," to any person "subpoe-
naed to testify before. . . any court of record," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 416.1 (Purdon 1958),
grant each witness seven cents for each mile that the witness must travel, id at § 416.4 (Cum.
Supp. 1978-79), provide $5.00 per night for lodging for witnesses that reside more than fifty
miles away, id at § 416.6 (1958), entitle subpoenaed witnesses, who attend the trial but are not
called to the stand, to witness fees, id at § 416.7, authorize the taxing as costs of all amounts
paid in accordance with the Act, id at § 416.8, and state that a subpoena is not effective unless
accompanied by a fee for one day plus mileage, id at § 416.10. Section 10 also states, "[t]he
provisions of this section shall not apply to witnesses subpoenaed to appear in criminal courts."
Id at § 416.10 (emphasis added). Thus, by negative implication, the previous nine sections of
the Witnesses Act apply to civil cases.
The Eminent Domain Code of 1964, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-519 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1978-79), allows taxing, as costs, of the statutory witness fee and "such other costs as the court
in the interests ofjustice may allow" in a condemnation proceeding. Such "other costs" do not
inclt de expert witness fees. In re Kling, 433 Pa. 118, 249 A.2d 552 (1969); Winkle v. Depart-
ment of Highways, 27 Beaver 202 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
In a partition of realty proceeding, the "compensation of an expert authorized by the
court shall be taxed as part of costs." PA. R. Civ. P. 1574.
Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970) (transferred to 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604), and under Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§ 4010(0 (Purdon 1977), the fees of attorneys and experts are recoverable by a successful liti-
gant at the court's discretion.
See Seitz v. United States Asbestos Div. of Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 14 Pa. D. & C.2d
56, 56 Lanc. 115 (C.P. 1958), in which the court reduced a doctor's fee for attending one day of
a Workman's Compensation proceeding from $10.00 to $5.00, pursuant to PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, § 171 (Purdon 1919) (repealed by the Witnesses Act for all but physicians, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 28, §§ 416.1 to .10 (Purdon 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1978-79) and repealed in its entirety in 1972
Pa. Laws 23, No. 11, § 1). See also Good v. Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Mach. Co., 15 Pa. D.
& C.2d 456, 50 Berks 130 (C.P. 1958).
compensation,76 but curiously, the Act emphasizes that the excess of
an expert witness' fee over the statutorily prescribed fee for an ordi-
nary witness may not be taxed against the unsuccessful party as a
cost.7 7 Therefore, since the excess of an expert's rightful fee must be
borne by the benefitted party, certain deserving litigants may have
the benefit they derived from an expert's services greatly dimin-
ished.7"
V. Statutes of Other States
The enactments of other jurisdictions regarding compensation
of expert witnesses display multiple variations, although the civil-
criminal distinction that is currently binding in Pennsylvania is not
discernable in most other states. For instance, the statutes of Illi-
nois79 and Michigan8 0 are among the most stringent. Each statute
states that an expert is entitled to no more than the ordinary witness
fee. Although Michigan grants the judge the power to authorize a
larger payment, which would be taxed as costs, any payment in ex-
cess of the prescribed amount is punishable by a contempt citation.8'
Illinois does not grant a trial judge discretionary powers, but neither
does it expressly forbid the benefitted party from recompensing an
expert witness.82
The vast majority of states espouse a more liberal standard,
76. The Witnesses Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 416.9 (Purdon 1958), states, "Nothing
herein contained shall affect the right of a witness who gives expert testimony to receive
additional per diem compensation therefor not taxable as costs." See also In re Heffner's
Estate, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 221, 18 Fiduc. 157, 89 Montg. 339 (C.P. 1968); Capozolla & Kent v.
D'Isidoro, 29 Northam. 211 (Pa. C.P. 1944). But see Hamill v. Lancaster County, 38 Pa.
County Ct. 175, 28 Lanc. 78, 24 York 144 (C.P. 1910).
The 1941 Act is to be liberally construed. Walker v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 Pa. Super.
Ct. 80, 29 A.2d 358 (1942).
77. The Witnesses Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 416.9 (Purdon 1958). See also In re
Kling, 433 Pa. 118, 249 A.2d 552 (1969) (expert witness fees are not costs in condemnation
proceedings); In re Heffner's Estate, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 221, 18 Fiduc. 157, 89 Montg. 339 (C.P.
1968) (contestant's application to direct the estate to defray the costs of a handwriting expert
denied); Donaldson v. Love, 25 Cambria L.J. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (plaintiff's bill of costs
amended by reducing medical expert witness' fee from $50.00 per day to $5.00 per day, the
statutorily prescribed fee); Rau v. Wilden Acres, Inc., 34 Northam. 88, 91 (Pa. C.P. 1955);
Capozolla & Kent v. D'Isidoro, 29 Northam. 211 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
78. See Meyer, The Expert Witness.- Some Proposalsfor Change, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
105 (1970).
The costs incurred in procuring the services of an expert witness would be "substantially
reduced if the testimony [could] be taken before a videotape machine in the expert's or the
lawyer's office." Id at 109. See also PA. R. Civ. P. 4017.1. Videotaped testimony has been
used extensively in Allegheny County since 1972, when the testimony of a physician, who was
"unable to appear," was presented by videotape. Rushe v. O'Malley, 120 Pitts. L.J. 249 (Pa.
C.P. Alleg. 1971).
79. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 53, § 65 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978).
80. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27 A. 2164(1) (1976).
81. Id See also Gilliland v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 52 Mich. App. 489, 218
N.W.2d 63 (1974).
82. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 53, § 65 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978). See also Commission-
ers of Lincoln Park v. Schmidt, 395 Ill. 316, 69 N.E.2d 869 (1946); Lewis v. Blye, 79 Ill. App.
256 (1899).
which is exemplified by the enactments of Colorado,83 Minnesota,84
North Dakota,85 and Virginia.86 North Dakota allows all reasonable
expert witness fees and expenses to be taxed against a losing party.
The judge, by exercising his broad discretionary powers, determines
the amount of the fees, the number of expert witnesses entitled to the
fees, and the amount of expenses to be taxed as costs. 87 Conceivably,
therefore, the amount of the expert's fee could exceed the amount of
the fee to be taxed as costs. The Colorado statute explicitly mandates
that an expert witness who testifies to an opinion is entitled to addi-
tional compensation "with reference to the value of the time em-
ployed and the degree of learning or skill required."88 Again, the
judge is vested with great discretion. In Minnesota the statute does
not establish a maximum ceiling for expert witness fees, but empow-
ers the judge to "allow such fees or compensation as, in his judg-
ment, may be just and reasonable. 89 Finally, the Virginia enactment
limits the power of the judge to set the expert witness' fee in those
instances in which he is requested to do so.9" No portion of the fee,
however, may be taxed as costs.9 '
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-33-102 (1974).
84. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 357.25 (West 1966).
85. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-06 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
86. VA. CODE § 14.1-190 (Replacement Vol. 1978).
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-06 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See United Dev. Corp. v. State
Highway Dep't, 133 N.W.2d 439 (N.D. 1965) (an expert's fees could not be taxed if the expert
is deemed incompetent to testify, but may be taxed if the expert's testimony is merely declared
"out of order").
In Delaware the entire fee is taxable within the discretion of the court. DEL. CODE tit. 10,
§ 8906 (Rev. 1975). See Stevenson v. Henning, 268 A.2d 872 (Del. 1970); State v. Lots Num-
bers 133, 134 & 135, 238 A.2d 837 (Del. 1968); Claus v. Bariarz, 41 Del. Ch. 158, 190 A.2d 19
(1963).
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-33-102 (1974). See Stavsky v. Callaham, 162 Colo. 208, 425
P.2d 686 (1967); Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 105 Colo. 366,
98 P.2d 283 (1940) (en banc); Yeager Garden Acres, Inc. v. Summit Constr. Co., 32 Colo. App.
242, 513 P.2d 458 (1973).
The Iowa and Louisiana statutes are similar to the Colorado statute. IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 622.72 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-79) ($150 per diem limit); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3666
(West 1968). See Snyder v. Iowa City, 40 Iowa 646 (1874); Glass v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166
So. 2d 552 (La. 1964) (allowing each expert witness $100.00); Johnson v. International Ins. Co.,
347 So. 2d 1279 (La. Ct. of App. 1977); Stubbs v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 343 So. 2d 258 (La.
Ct. of App. 1977); Maturin v. Scotty Brick Co., 292 So. 2d 859 (La. Ct. of App. 1974).
89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 357.25 (West 1966). See Carpenter v. Mattison, 300 Minn. 273,
219 N.W.2d 625 (1974); State v. Wiebke, 154 Minn. 61, 191 N.W. 249 (1922).
90. VA. CODE § 14.1-190 (1977).
91. 1d.
To be entitled to compensation greater than that allowed an ordinary witness in Califor-
nia, an expert must testify solely as an expert, absent special agreement. Bureau of Medical
Economics v. Cossette, 44 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 118 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1974). See also CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 68092.5(a) (West 1976); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1027 (West 1970).
In Florida, an expert witness who "offers himself," qualifies, and testifies in a civil case,
gets $10.00 per hour or whatever the judge deems reasonable. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.231 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978).
"No man's particular services shall be demanded without just compensation" in Indiana.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 21. See also Buchman v. State, 59 Ind. I (1877).
In New York, a witness' fee will be taxed as costs only in a "difficult and extraordinary
case." Rotheray v. Rubber Co., 90 N.Y. 30 (1882); Coon v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
The legislative trend is moving toward recognition of an ex-
pert's property right in his knowledge, skill, and experience. An
overwhelming proportion of the recently enacted statutes grant the
trial judge great discretion in determining whether expert fees are
appropriate in calculating the amount of such fees, and in deciding
how much of that fee should be taxed against the unsuccessful party
as costs.9 2 This response recognizes that the compensation to which
an expert witness is entitled should not be restricted to the fixed stat-
utory limit for an ordinary witness, but should be issued as an
amount that is fair and reasonable to the expert and the parties in a
given situation.93
VI. Court-Appointed Experts
A. Reform Measures to Reduce Partisanism
The amount and manner of an expert's compensation constitute
two of the chief deficiencies of the present system, 94 since experts
who receive special compensation may testify with less than com-
plete objectivity.95 This problem may be minimized through in-
creased accessibility of court-appointed experts.96
Federal Rule of Evidence 706, which is patterned after the
Model Expert Testimony Act9 7 and the Uniform Rules of Evi-
198 N.Y.S. 317 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (citing N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1513 (McKinney 1920) (current
version found in § 8301(a) (1963))). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 610.50 (McKinney
1971).
Compare Henkel v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 284 U.S. 444 (1932) (state statute con-
cerning greater expert witness fees not applicable to federal trial in Minnesota) with Chemical
Bank v. Kimmel, 68 F.R.D. 679 (D. Del. 1975) (state rule adopted by federal court).
92. See notes 83-91 and accompanying text supra.
93. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970) (transferred to 42
U.S.C.A. § 7604); Pennsylvania's Air Pollution Control Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4010(0
(Purdon 1977). See J. WIGMORE, supra note I, at §§ 2202(2)(b), 2203(2)(c).
94. Bomar, supra note 4, at 521.
95. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY 7 (1956) [hereinafter cited as IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTI-
MONY].
96. See generally Wayne v. Kosoff, 136 N.J. Super. 53, 344 A.2d 328 (App. Div. 1975)
(per curiam); G. HAUGEN, THE PSYCHIATRIST AS A WITNESS 34 (1966); Molinari, The Role of
the Expert Witness, 9 FORUM 789 (1974).
A trial judge undoubtably possesses the inherent power to appoint an independent expert
to aid in the "quest for the elusive truth of the matter." Wayne v. Kosoff, 136 N.J. Super. 53,
56-57, 344 A.2d 328, 329-30 (App. Div. 1975) (per curiam). See also Dinsel v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 144 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Edwards v. Prutzman, 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 184, 188, 165
A. 255, 256 (1933) (appointment of a handwriting expert to check the possibility of fraud in the
ballot box determined to be a proper expenditure for "things necessary to the administration of
justice"); Berger v. Public Parking Authority, 101 Pitts. L.J. 39 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1953).
97. The Model Expert Testimony Act was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1937. See C. MCCORMACK, EVIDENCE § 17 (2d ed. 1972). See generally Expert
Witness Fees, supra note 19, at 777; Expert Witness Fees. Protection for the Indigent Party,
supra note 34, at 106.
The only state that has adopted the Model Expert Testimony Act in toto is South Dakota.
See S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-6-1 to -17 (1967).
dence,98 aptly addresses this dilemma.
Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable
compensation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compen-
sation thus fixed is payable from a fund which may be provided
by law in criminal cases and civil actions and proceedings involv-
ing just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other civil
actions and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the
parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs,
and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
99
Refusal of a plaintiff to pay its share of a court-appointed expert's
fee is sufficient to warrant dismissal of the action."° The substance
of Rule 706 has been adopted into the evidentiary rules of many
states. 1o
Pennsylvania's law for court-appointed experts in civil proceed-
ings is less liberal. It provides that
in actions involving complicated accounts, or questions requiring
the evidence of experts, the court may employ an accountant or
other expert to aid in the proper disposition of the action. The
report or evidence of such accountant or other expert shall be
available to any party and he shall be subject to examination or
cross-examination by any party. He shall be paid reasonable com-




Court costs include the fees of experts appointed by the court.'0 3
Despite these general rules, when the defendant is an indigent the
court may order the appointment of an expert when paternity is at
issue."° In such cases, blood tests are conducted by a court-ap-
pointed expert, who will report his findings and be subject to cross-
examination by each party. 0 5 The expert's compensation is fixed at a
98. C. MCCORMACK supra note 96, at § 17; 9A, UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 536, Rule 60.
99. FED. R. EvID. 706 (emphasis added). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 28. See generally C.
MCCORMACK, supra note 96, at § 17.
100. United States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 416 F. Supp. 313 (D.N.J. 1976) (mem.);
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
101. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 3 (Smith-
Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978); Cost of the Expert, supra note II, at 325-27. See generally Ordover,
supra note 2, at 825; IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 94, at 10.
102. PA. R. Civ. P. 1515. See also N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW 3036(2) (McKinney 1974).
See proposals concerning court appointed experts discussed in Pennsylvania Law section,
Section IV supra.
103. PA. R. Civ. P. 1523. Allowance of costs in equity is within the discretion of the judge.
Cadillac Real Estate Co. v. Roddy Realty, Inc., 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 199 (C.P. Luz. 1966); Ashton
v. Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Co., 69 Pa. D. & C. 277, 97 Pitts. L.J. 249 (C.P. Alleg. 1949).
In a Florida felony case, the court may summon an expert witness for the government or
for an indigent defendant, and he will be awarded "reasonable compensation." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 914.06 (West 1973).
A judge should appoint a disinterested expert not only to relieve the judge or jury of
confusion, Wayne v. Kosoff, 136 N.J. Super. 53, 344 A.2d 328 (App. Div. 1975) (per curiam),
but also to aid in the establishment and support of a destitute party's case. The granting of a
party's request for a court appointed expert, although obtainable, should not be automatic.
The conferment, as in the case of indigent criminal defendants, should be allowed upon a
showing of necessity. Gallagher v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 31 F.R.D. 36 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
104. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 307.1 to .11 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-79) (UNIFORM ACT
ON BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY).
105. Id at § 307.2.
reasonable amount and paid as the court may order. 106 Thus, a court
may order the parties to pay for the expert proportionately, or order
the county to pay any such proportion and tax any remainder as
costs. 07
B. Federal Pro visionsfor an Accused Indigent
Provisions in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 ° s for impecuni-
ous defendants extend beyond the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Criminal Procedure.'0 9 The purpose of the Act is to "achieve more
meaningful and effective representation for defendants in federal
criminal cases."'" This legislation provides compensation for neces-
sary expert and investigative services for criminal defendants who
are financially incapable of securing such services. Specifically,
counsel for a financially indigent defendant may apply to the court
for expert or investigative services, which will be authorized upon a
showing "that the services are necessary and that the person is
financially unable to obtain them.""' Subject to subsequent review,
appointed counsel may obtain the services without prior authoriza-
tion if the total cost of the services does not exceed $150.00, exclusive
of reasonably incurred expenses." 2 Notwithstanding other provi-
sions of the Act, compensation for each service may not exceed
$300.00 excluding expenses,
unless payment in excess of that amount is certified by the court,
or by the United States magistrate if the services were rendered in
connection with a case disposed of entirely before him, as neces-
sary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual char-
acter or duration, and the amount of the excess payment is
approved by the chief judge of the circuit.' 13
106. Id at § 307.3.
107. Of course, the fee of any expert called by a party who has not been appointed by the
court is not taxed as costs. Cf Section 8 of the Witnesses Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 416.8
(Purdon 1958) (allowing the statutory fee for ordinary witnesses to be taxed as costs if the
witness testifies or if he attends pursuant to a subpoena and is not called).
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976), as amended by the Adequate Defense Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 91-447, § l(a), 84 Stat. 916.
109. See note 98 and accompanying text supra. An ordinary witness in a federal court is
entitled to $20.00 a day for his attendance and time, plus ten cents a mile for necessary travel.
28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976).
110. H.R. REP. No. 91-1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3982, 3984.
Ill. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(I) (1976), as amended by the Adequate Defense Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 91-447, § 1(a), 84 Stat. 916. See United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th
Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970) (a court should not
withhold its authority if further exploration probably will prove beneficial to the defense);
People v. Hicks, 35 Ill. 2d 390, 220 N.E.2d 461 (1966) (a mere verbal representation is not a
sufficient showing of necessity to authorize a public expenditure for an expert's services).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(2) (1976).
113. Id at § 3006A(e)(3). Appropriations made to the United States courts are to be ex-
pended to effectuate the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, with payments being
supervised by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Id at
§ 3006A(j).
Interestingly, a federal court may not deny an indigent the services of an expert when a
Absent the court's waiver of the $300.00 ceiling, an award of greater
than the maximum amount will be granted only if the excess is war-
ranted by a different statutory authority."I4 There is no set rate of
compensation under the Act; rather, the standard is typically a "fair
and reasonable charge in the locality in which the services are ren-
dered." I' I
VII. Calculating Fees and Methods of Payment
A. A "Fair and Reasonable" Fee
In attempting to define a "fair and reasonable" standard of
compensation, courts and statutes have considered the following spe-
cific elements: qualifications of the expert; 1 6 degree of learning or
skill required;" 7 importance of the case and the responsibility as-
sumed by the expert;" 8 usefulness of the expert's report and testi-
mony; I 9 time spent in preparation and performance of special
services;120 time spent in testifying in an expert capacity;21 stand-by
time "at the place of trial during the time required for attend-
ance";l22 loss of revenue in anticipation of trial; 23 generally ac-
showing is made that the services are necessary to an adequate defense. United States v. Bass,
477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970) (a
court should not withhold its authority if further exploration may well prove beneficial to the
defense); People v. Hick, 35 111. 2d 390, 220 N.E.2d 461 (1966) (a mere verbal representation is
not a sufficient showing of necessity to authorize a public expenditure for an expert's services).
114. United States v. Bryant, 311 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1970) (mem.) (excess of $300.00
authorized by FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b)).
115. United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966) (the standard is in-
dependent of the amount that the Government pays its witnesses). See United States ex rel.
T.V.A. v. 109 Acres of Land, 404 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (mem.).
116. Johnson v. International Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 1279 (La. Ct. of App. 1977); Edwards v.
Prutzman, 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 184, 165 A. 255 (1933); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-13-102 (1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.72 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-79); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3666 (West
1968).
117. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-33-102 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.72 (West Cum. Supp.
1978-79); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3666 (West 1968).
118. Doud, supra note 37.
This is a question of some delicacy because the importance of any litigation naturally
depends somewhat on the amount involved. More important, however, is the fact
that importance matters require important decisions and a greater responsibility on
the part of the expert witness. The professional man of the greatest experience and
reputation is usually engaged in the matters, and the outcome of the case depends
much on his ability in presenting his evidence. He should be well paid for the serv-
ices.
Id at 90.
119. Johnson v. International Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 1279 (La. Ct. of App. 1977); Edward v.
Prutzman, 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 184, 165 A. 255 (1933).
120. City of Daytona Beach v. Humphreys, 53 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1951); Johnson v. Interna-
tional Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 1279 (La. Ct. of App. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-33-102 (1973);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.72 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.3666
(West 1968); J. BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 10; Doud, supra note 36, at 89-90.
121. See cases and statutes cited at id; J. BROOKE, ARTHRITIS AND THE MEDICAL WIT-
NESS 140 (1966) (include invaluable time spent in pretrial conference); Doud, supra note 37, at
89-90.
122. J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, at § 2202(b)(2).
123. An attorney can rarely tell an expert exactly when he will be required to attend trial.
cepted rates in the community; 124 and awards in similar cases. 12
5
Occasionally, the expenses incurred by an expert are also included in
the computation of a "fair and reasonable" fee.
12 6
B. Methods of Payment
1. Contract.-The most widely used method of employing an
expert is by a contract that enumerates either an hourly wage or a
flat fee for each service to be performed. Such a contract is binding
and valid in states that consider an expert's testimony to be a prop-
erty right and, therefore, a proper form of consideration. 127 Con-
versely, an ordinary witness could not so contract since, aside from
violating public policy, the contract would lack consideration.
128
2. Contingent Fee.-Traditionally, contingent fees for expert
witnesses have been deemed illegal, violative of the ethical precepts
of law and medicine, and adverse to public policy.' 29 Moreover, the
Therefore, "the physician can at such a time make only appointments that [can] be quickly
cancelled without damage to the patient. He may have to turn over some patients to a col-
league if the condition is critical." G. HAUGEN, supra note 96, at 24. See also Doud, supra
note 37, at 89-90.
124. United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1966); J. BEEMAN, supra note 35, at
10; G. HAUGEN, supra note 96, at 33; C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 18 (1969); Doud,
supra note 37, at 89-90.
125. Johnson v. International Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 1279, 1284 (La. Ct. of App. 1977).
126. Edwards v. Prutzman, 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 184, 187, 165 A. 255, 255-56 (1933); J.
BEEMAN, supra note 35, at 10; J. WIGMORE, supra note I, at § 2202(2)(b); Doud, supra note 36,
at 89-90. See also Bennett v. Home Ins. Co., 347 F. Supp. 451 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Yeager Garden
Acres, Inc. v. Summit Constr. Co., 32 Colo. App. 242, 513 P.2d 458 (1973) ($1000 for an
expert's preparation and testimony valuing a partially completed building is not an abuse of
discretion); State Highway Dep't v. Lots Numbers 133, 134 & 135, 238 A.2d 837 (Del. 1968)
(per curiam); ($100 for three and one-half hours spent in necessary attendance at a trial for an
eminent domain action is a fair and reasonable amount); Carpenter v. Mattison, 300 Minn.
273, 219 N.W.2d 625 (1974); Mazzarella v. Campo-Site, Inc., 20 N.J. Misc. 182, 26 A.2d 276
(1942); In re Darreffs Estate, 64 Pa. D. & C.2d 650 (C.P. Phila. 1973) ($1,000 for the services
of a reviewing accountant in a probate proceeding is proper).
The amount of an expert's fee, or his expectancy thereof, is a legitimate matter for cross-
examination, for an exhorbitant fee or a contingent fee may reflect bias or interest on the part
of the expert. Zamsky v. Public Parking Auth., 378 Pa. 38, 105 A.2d 335 (1954); Common-
wealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 862, reh. denied, 338 U.S.
888 (1949); Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A.2d 142 (1945); Reed v. Philadelphia Transp.
Co., 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 60, 90 A.2d 371 (1952); Duffy v. Griffith, 134 Pa. Super. Ct. 447, 4 A.2d
170 (1939); Fullerton v. Commonwealth, 107 Pitts. L.J. 274 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1959); M. HOUTS,
LAWYERS GUIDE TO MEDICAL PROOF § 2022.01 (1977); M. KRAFT, USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL
CASES 28-32 (1977) (impeaching a professional expert witness); R. REDFIELD, CROSS-EXAMI-
NATION AND THE WITNESS 127-28 (1963).
127. Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463 (1857); Barnes v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank, 348 Mo. 1032,
156 S.W.2d 597 (1941); Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934); Clifford v.
Hughes, 139 App. Div. 730, 124 N.Y.S. 478 (1910); Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 508,
243 A.2d 150 (1968); State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 82 S.D. 139, 143 N.W.2d 88 (1966); The
Witnesses Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 416.1 to .10 (Purdon 1958 & Cum. Supp. 1978-79);
Hall, supra note 11, at 83-84. An exception to the rule may be permitted in extraordinary
circumstances, such as for travel expenses if the witness lives outside the jurisdiction of the
court. Id at 83-84. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
128. Barnes v. Boatman's Nat'l Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941); Stanton v.
Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A. 721 (1934).
129. M. Hours, supra note 126, at § 37.09. Such policies have frequently been circum-
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits attorneys from
entering into such arrangements. 30 Nevertheless, this prohibition
has been subject to close judicial scrutiny and has recently been de-
clared unconstitutional by the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of New York.' 3' Since that decision, support for contingent
fee arrangements has become increasingly evident. 132 Potential liti-
gants may be unable to vindicate a valid claim merely because they
are unable to compensate expert witnesses in a manner conditioned
upon an award of damages. Use of contingent fee arrangements can
effectively overcome this financial restriction, especially when the fee
is fixed by the court at a fair and reasonable amount.
33
VIII. Recommendations and Conclusion
Pennsylvania's statutory scheme fails to recognize that experts
are playing an increased role in the disposition of litigation. Since an
expert's services are solely the subject of bargaining in Penn-
sylvania's civil proceedings, unbearable burdens are cast upon desti-
tute litigants. Such an impediment can be removed by empowering
trial judges with the ability to establish expert witness fees at a fair
and reasonable amount and to tax these fees as costs as they choose.
vented by disguising the contingent fee arrangements. Id See, e.g., Ealy v. Shetler Ice Cream
Co., 108 W. Va. 184, 150 S.E. 539 (1929). An astute attorney will pay the fee in advance, out of
his own pocket if necessary, to avoid the appearance of contingency. G. HAUGEN, supra note
96, at 32.
Compare Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 243 A.2d 150 (1968) (fee arrangement
in which a real estate appraiser was to receive a fixed percentage of the recovery plus fifty
dollars a day for testifying invalidated as against public policy) with Barnes v. Boatman's Nat'l
Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1941) (mere fact that an expert witness' fee is by con-
tract, contingent upon the success of a suit, is not sufficient reason to invalidate the contract).
130. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(c).
(c) A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensa-
tion to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the outcome of
the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in the payment of:
(1) Expenses reasonably incurred by a witness in attending or testifying.
(2) Reasonable compensation to a witness for his loss of time in attending or
testifying.
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
Id This rule is "designed to achieve a policy goal of unperjured or unbiased testimony." 81
DICK. L. REV. 655, 657 (1977).
131. Person v. Association of Bar, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Note, The Contingent Compensation of Expert
Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 52 IND. L.J. 671 (1977); 81 DICK. L. REV. 655 (1977); 1977 Wis. L.
REV. 603.
132. See, e.g., Note, Contingent Feesfor Expert Witnesses in Civil Litigation, 86 YALE L.J.
1680 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Contingent Fees]; note 130 supra.
133. Contingent Fees, supra note 132, at 1714. See notes 116-26 and accompanying text
supra.
The bias of an expert employed by a party is grossly exaggerated. In most situations, the
courts are justified in placing their trust in the expert. Contingent fee arrangements do not
have to be prohibited to safeguard possible expert testimonial bias, since there are other means
available to achieve this end. Specifically, "[blias in expert evidence can be minimized in four
ways: court appointment of experts, use of the qualification process [in which an expert must
be specially certified before he may render an expert opinion in court], use of opposing experts,
and impeachment during cross-examination." Contingent Fees, supra note 132, at 1693.
To forestall abuse, the power of the trial judge to set and appor-
tion the fees of expert witnesses could be subjected to a realistic max-
imum per diem limitation. Alternatively, a special provision
prescribing certain fees for expert witnesses who perform certain
enumerated services could be enacted. 34 In any event, court-ap-
pointed experts should always be made available to an indigent
party who demonstrates financial hardship and a need for the serv-
ices of an expert.'
35
Giving the trial judge broad discretionary powers in all aspects
of expert witness compensation is necessary to allow all interested
parties the opportunity to benefit fully from the services of exerts.
The adoption of such changes will naturally result in fairer trials and
better representation of each party's interests. Such goals are unde-
niably desirable.
JAMES H. RICHARDSON, JR.
134. Since the types of services that experts perform for parties vary considerably, a catch-
all clause would have to be included in any enactment of this nature. Such a statute would
require frequent review and updating to conform with changing community standards.
135. See notes 64-67, 108-15 and accompanying text supra. See also PA. R. Civ. P. 1515,
1523 (Pennsylvania's current provision concerning court appointed experts).

